China’s military suffering indigestion

China’s military suffering indigestion

Messrs. Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jeou shook hands for a full 80 seconds when they met on neutral turf in Singapore on 8 November.It was the first time in 66 years, the first time ever, for the leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China to meet.Understandably there was exuberant media interest in this historic event. Xi noted at the occasion, “We are one family.We are brothers who are still connected by our flesh even if our bones are broken.”
However, there was some disingenuous talk that Taiwan’s president later highlighted. On his return flight from Singapore, Ma told reporters he was not satisfied with Xi’s response when he brought up the military threat facing Taiwan.Xi had apparently said, “These deployments do not target Taiwan.” This is patently untrue, with China estimated to have some 1,200 ballistic missiles aimed across the Taiwan Strait. Indeed, the latest US Department of Defense reports list just how uneven the military balance is. China has 1.25 million ground troops versus 130,000 in Taiwan; 6,947 tanks versus 1,100; 58 submarines versus four; 1,700 fighters versus 388; and 73 frigates/destroyers versus 26.The ‘Quadrennial Defense Review’, published by Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense in 2013, highlighted the reason for the island’s plight: “Mainland China has never renounced military actions and preparations against Taiwan, and continues to formulate operational guidance and plans targeting Taiwan.” Another document states the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will have the “combat capability to mount a full attack on Taiwan by 2020” based on current levels of military spending and development.Taiwanese people do feel an acute sense of unease at China’s military build-up opposite their island, although the fear has been lessening in recent years. While polls show the majority of Taiwanese want improved dialogue with China (68.5% in 2014), increasingly fewer of them back the idea of reunification (just 7.3% in 2014).While the PLA clearly has a decisive advantage in military equipment versus Taiwan.and India.and virtually everyone else, there are signs the force is experiencing a case of incapacitating indigestion as it inducts an array of flashy new equipment. Andrei Chang, editor of Kanwa Asian Defence Monthly, highlighted many of these troubles in the magazine’s November issue.He speculates that, with modern equipment reaching the PLA at such a rapid pace, the training and proficiency of operators is lagging well behind. He summarized, “There are some traces indicating that a majority of the new weapons of the PLA Army, Navy [PLAN] and Air Force [PLAAF] have not achieved full operational capability in the past five years, and there are also serious problems in training and personnel.”
What are the symptoms? Beginning with the PLAAF, Chang points out that, in the decade since the J-10 fighter was introduced, only one photo has emerged of it fully equipped with weapons and auxiliary fuel tanks, and just one photo showing the J-10 releasing precision-guided munitions. The editor also listed just one known photo of the Su-30MKK fighter equipped with a full weapons load, and only one of it performing aerial refueling.Additionally, the indigenous J-11 fighter has never been photographed with a full combat load to date. Of particular interest, Kanwa has never seen any photos of the J-10, J-11 or Su-30 doing night training. Such night-time flying should be the bread and butter of any credible air force, but this skill seems undernourished in the PLAAF.While it might be argued the PLAAF is simply censoring photos of its aircraft, it is also true that the government is interested in promoting its technological prowess. This explains the ‘strategic release’ on the internet of photos of groundbreaking new aircraft such as the J-20 and J-31 stealth fighters.
The PLAAF is not the only service suffering from this kind of indigestion. Chang reports satellite imagery showing 80% of PLAN nuclear submarines remain in port on any given day. An article in the PLA Daily published on 31 December 2014 reported “a small number” of PLA troops were not willing to, or dared not use, new weapons. Kanwa commented: “If it was indeed just a small number, was it worth it publishing the report at all?”Training is another area where digestive problems are well documented. Chang highlights insufficient training as a chief cause of indigestion. For example, despite introducing hundreds of new-generation aircraft, there is only a handful of L15 advanced jet trainers available for trainee pilots to practice their craft and to help make the leap to modern platforms. Therefore, many pilots must jump straight from the JL-8 intermediate jet trainer to twin-seat Su-27 or J-10 fighters, and the number of flight hours accumulated seems far less than pilots in NATO air forces.
A second root cause of the PLA’s indigestion noted by Chang is the issue of training curriculums. “Based on Kanwa’s investigations into the training curriculum of the Chinese armed forces, many of the training programs for new weapons do not follow a unified curriculum.” In other words, education and training on new equipment often occurs ahead of deployment to combat units. Thus, the role of training academies is regularly bypassed, which has a negative impact on effective military education.
A final cause mentioned by Chang is the quality of officers and troops. There is great diversity in the educational attainments of Chinese recruits, with many from rural areas not fully educated. Corruption has a role to play here too, since military ranks and positions have traditionally been bought and sold with ease. Despite Xi’s anti-corruption campaign, it is impossible to believe that all money-making endeavors have been wiped out. Widespread cheating in exercises remains rampant too.
Released in September by the USA’s Congressional Research Service, ‘The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress’ document stated, “PLA officers must spend hours each week studying CCP [Chinese Communist Party] pronouncements and burnishing their loyalty to the party. Compared to other militaries, the PLA has underutilized its non-commissioned officers, and its lower-level officers are not as empowered to improvise decisions during battle.Corrupt PLA officials diverted military resources for personal profit and bribed senior PLA leaders in exchange for promotions, according to reports.”
Kanwa quoted one anecdote. “A large military exercise needed engineering troops, but the regiment commander was unable to assign them for the mission because all of them had been sent out on private jobs; they were assigned to a civil construction site to earn extra money.”
Chang concluded, “When Western researchers examine the combat capability of the Chinese armed forces, they should also take into consideration the educational level and socioeconomic background of the rank-and-file servicemen in addition to the military equipment in service. The former could be in fact a more important factor.”
Therefore, although Taiwan may feel threatened by the sheer quantity of PLA weaponry aimed at it, there are question marks over how well it can be wielded. Other neighbors also faced with the snowballing might of the PLA – such as India, Vietnam and Japan – may also take comfort from this persistent case of indigestion.
A document entitled ‘Threat Tactics Report: China’, issued by TRADOC in the US military, said, “The PLA has further advanced its professionalism efforts by recruitment changes and improved training programs.However, despite significant progress, it should be noted that the PLA lacks formal combat experience and still struggles.”
The PLA’s training program is a combination of force-on-force events, advanced simulation and practice using automated tools to aid in command decisions. In 2009 the PLA released an updated tactics doctrine reflecting lessons learned by the Chinese force as well as through observations garnered from US and allied operations overseas. However, training and exercises have historically been highly scripted and did not engender a culture of honest self-examination and improvement.
The Congressional Research Service report also observed, “Although the PLA may overcome certain limitations in capacity or training realism in the near term, other weaknesses could remain for decades while the PLA attempts to correct them…The lack of combat experience for nearly all PLA personnel may be one reason that organizational problems were allowed to fester, and it could continue to inhibit rapid learning and incorporation of organizational improvements.”
The PLA is well aware of these shortcomings, so it is taking ‘Quick-Eze’ tablets to reduce the discomfort as it attempts to improve its training regimen. However, a culture of cheating, corruption and poor training methodologies cannot be overturned in a matter of just weeks and months.

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